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INTRODUCTION
A 1974 federal statute, the Buckley Amendment (Buckley), also
known as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act or FERPA,1
comprehensively regulates student records kept by most United States
schools, both public and private, whether serving students at the
elementary, secondary, or higher education levels.2 As a condition of
receiving federal education funds, Buckley requires schools to provide
parents of minor pre-college students, and adult and college students,
access to their school records, confidentiality in those records, and an
opportunity to challenge their accuracy.
Enforcing Buckley has been problematic, and, consequently,
litigants have treated Buckley largely as an afterthought.' Buckley
* B.A., The Johns Hopkins University, 1980; Ph.D. (Education), Duke University, 1984;
J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law, 1987. Associate Professor of Law, Adjunct
Professor of Education, Gonzaga University. Thanks to J. Mark Angelus and Jennifer Aspaas
for their excellent research assistance. Any errors are, of course, the author's responsibility.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994). Buckley is part of the General Education Provisions Act
(GEPA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1234 (1994). Buckley regulations are at 34 C.F.R. § 99.1 to 99.67
(1996).
2. For a discussion of the educational agencies covered by Buckley, see infra notes 18-19,
and accompanying text.
3. Scholars too have largely ignored Buckley. The author could find only two law review
articles published in 1980 or later on Buckley issues, and both pre-date the 1994 statutory
amendments. See Alexander Papandreou, Comment, Krebs v. Rutgers: The Potential for
Disclosure of Highly Personal Confidential Information Renders Questionable the Use of Social
Security Numbers as Student Identification Numbers, 20 J.C. & U. L. 79 (1993); Charles Tremper
and Mark Small, Privacy Regulation of Computer Assisted Testing and Instruction, 63 WASH. L.
REV. 841 (1988). There are also three post-1980 articles on Buckley issues, some by educators
without law degrees, in the West's Education Law Reporter. See Mary Gelfman & Nadine
Schwab, School Health Services and Educational Records: Conflicts in the Law, 64 W. EDUC. L.
REP. 319 (1991); T. Page Johnson, Managing Educational Records: The Courts and the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 79 W. EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1993); Ralph Mawdsley,
Litigation Involving FERPA, 110 W. EDUC. L. REP. 897 (1996). A third law review article,
promisingly titled "To Disclose or Not To Disclose: The Dilemma of the School Counselor,"
inexplicably does not mention Buckley. See Stephen Ripps, Martin Ritchie, Mary Chaffee, To
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itself provides for enforcement solely through filing complaints with a
federal office for voluntary resolution.4 The only sanction available
against schools, withdrawal of all federal education funds,' has never
been imposed. After an early, and singularly unsuccessful, attempt to
get courts to recognize a private cause of action,6 case law dealing with
Buckley consisted largely of secondary claims tacked on to, for
example, special education statutory claims.7 Recently, however, a
growing number of courts have either held or suggested that a civil
rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983) may be used to
redress alleged Buckley violations.'
This Article explores enforcement of Buckley and, in particular,
the possibilities of using Section 1983 claims for this purpose. It
concludes that Section 1983 claims have only limited potential, under
narrowly defined circumstances, as a remedy for Buckley violations.
Part I of this Article summarizes Buckley's substantive provisions; a
comprehensive review is available in a companion article.9
Part II reviews enforcement of Buckley, other than through
Section 1983 claims. Specifically, Part II examines the statute's two
enforcement mechanisms as well as the potential of state law tort
claims to enforce Buckley and the indirect enforcement mechanism of
workplace discipline of employees who violate Buckley.
Part III of this Article first reviews Section 1983 doctrine generally
as well as its potential to redress Buckley violations. Part III concludes
that, while Section 1983 claims are an available remedy to redress
Buckley violations, established Section 1983 doctrine significantly limits
potential defendants, success, and remedies for such claims.
Part IV of the Article explores five problems inherent in the
(weak) array of enforcement mechanisms currently available for
Buckley. The Article concludes by urging Congress to reexamine
Buckley's enforcement mechanisms and suggests an administrative
Disclose or Not To Disclose: The Dilemma of the School Counselor, 13 MISS. C. L. REV. 323
(1993).
4. See Maynard v. Greater Hoyt Sch. Dist. No. 61-4, 876 F. Supp. 1104 (D.S.D. 1995).
For a discussion of the complaint process provided by Buckley, see infra notes 96-108 and
accompanying text.
5. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2) and (f) (1994); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.62-.67 (1996).
6. For a partial list of the court decisions rejecting a private cause of action under Buckley,
see infra note 116 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Odom v. Columbia Univ., 906 F. Supp. 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Buckley
claim added to suit primarily alleging a violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
8. For a discussion of the cases in which Buckley-based Section 1983 claims have been
brought, see infra Part III.B.
9. See Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up Buckley I: Making the Federal Student Records Statute
Work, 46 CATH. L. REV. 617 (1997).
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remedy which would address the identified problems with existing
enforcement mechanisms.
I. OVERVIEW OF BuCKLEY/FERPA 0
Buckley was enacted in 1974.11 According to its sponsor,
Buckley was enacted to cure "the growing evidence of the abuse of
student records across the nation"12 by (1) assuring parent access to
records and (2) protecting the privacy of those records. 3 Buckley also
provides parents an opportunity to challenge records. There is some
dispute about whether Buckley's purpose is to address individual
records violations or merely to prevent systemic violations. 4
Buckley also requires schools to notify parents annually of their
Buckley rights.1" Further, Buckley is part of the General Education
Provisions Act16 and as such operates as a condition on the receipt of
most federal education funds, rather than as a direct mandate.17  No
federal funds are available to schools specifically to help them comply
with Buckley.
A. Schools and Other Agencies Covered by Buckley
Any educational agency, public or private, state or local, at the
elementary, secondary, or higher education level that receives federal
education funds under most programs" (including, for example,
federally guaranteed student loans) is subject to Buckley.'9 For the
sake of simplicity, this Article refers to the various educational agencies
covered by Buckley as "schools."
10. This overview is adapted from the more comprehensive review in a companion article
by the author. See Daggett, supra note 9.
11. See 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 1221-1234 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
12. 121 Cong. Rec. S7974 (May 13, 1975).
13. See 121 Cong. Rec. 39,863 (December 13, 1974). See also Belanger v. Nashua, N.H.,
Sch. Dist., 856 F. Supp. 40, 46 (D.N.H. 1994) (noting these dual purposes); Zaal v. State, 602
A.2d 1247, 1255 (Md. App. 1992) (same); Student Press Law Center v. Alexander, 778 F. Supp.
1227, 1229 (D.D.C. 1991) (same).
14. See Smith v. Duquesne Univ., 612 F. Supp. 72, 80 (W.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 787 F.2d
583 (3rd Cir. 1986) (taking the latter view); Zaal, 602 A.2d at 1255 (same).
15. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(e) (1994).
16. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1234.
17. See id.
18. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.1(b) (1996) for a list of Department of Education funded programs
which do not trigger Buckley obligations.
19. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(a)(3) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 99.1 (1996). Language added in 1994
clarified that Buckley applies to state educational agencies. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(a)(1)(B). Receipt
of federal funds other than through the Department of Education does not subject a school to
Buckley. For example, receipt of school lunch funds, which flow from the Department of
Agriculture, does not trigger Buckley.
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B. "Student" "Records" Under Buckley
"Records" covered by Buckley must be those of "students" in (or
formerly in)20 attendance at the school. 2' For example, a student
who is not accepted to law school, or who is accepted but does not
enroll, has no Buckley right to access her application file.22  "Re-
cords" are defined quite broadly by the statute. Any recorded
information created or maintained 23 by a school, or a school employ-
ee, or a person "acting for" 24 a school (such as an independent
contractor or privately retained attorney)25 that directly relates to a
20. Readers still curious about what their third grade teacher thought of them, or eager to
know their IQs, could exercise their rights under Buckley and ask their former elementary schools
for access to their records. However, as Buckley does not require schools to maintain records for
any specified period of time, the records may have been destroyed.
21. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (attendance may include enrollment in
a correspondence class or work-study program).
22. See United States v. Brown Univ., 1992 WL 2513 at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (finding federal
government subpoena of financial aid records of students accepted at, but choosing not to attend,
school not subject to Buckley because not records of "students"); Norwood v. Slammons, 788 F.
Supp. 1020, 1026 (W.D. Ark 1991) (holding plaintiff, who was accepted to defendant law school
but did not enroll, had no standing under Buckley to complain of school's refusal to release
student records); Vandiver v. Star-Telegram, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 103, 107 (Tex. App. 1988)
(holding records about athlete recruited by school were not Buckley records absent proof recruit
had become a student at a school; thus, records were subject to disclosure under state open
records law).
23. Records need not be created by the school; it is sufficient if the school maintains them.
However, when a school had a record, but no longer has a copy, there is no Buckley record. See
Olsson v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 571 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ind. App. 1991) (letter written
by university faculty member evaluating student's performance as student teacher was not Buckley
record where no copy of the letter was kept by the school). In this case, the request for records
was apparently made after the school had decided not to keep a copy of the letter. Of course, if
a Buckley request for records is pending, they cannot be destroyed. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.10(e)
(1996).
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A)(ii) (1994). One court has held that student information held
by the NCAA and an athletic conference are not records maintained by them "on behalf of"
member schools. See Kneeland v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 650 F. Supp. 1076, 1089
(W.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1986). While the Kneeland
court did not address this issue, it would seem that records sent by schools to the NCAA would
be subject to Buckley obligations regarding redisclosure, strengthened by statutory amendment
in 1994. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4)(B), amended by Act of Oct. 20, 1994, 20 U.S.C.S.
§ 1232g(b)(4)(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). Due to the amendment in 1994, Buckley now
requires that organizations which receive student records from schools lose access to such records
for at least five years if the receiving organization provides access to them without parent consent.
Id.
25. For example, many schools contract with professionals such as physical therapists to
provide related services to disabled students. Such persons and their records related to this
contract would be Buckley records.
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particular student is a "record" for Buckley purposes.2 6 The record
must contain "personally identifiable" information about a student,
usually (but not always) her name.2 7  The information need not be
recorded in words nor contained in written documents. Any perma-
nent recording such as a tape or film, a picture, or a computer file 28
can be a "record. ' 29  Unrecorded information, such as something
heard by a teacher, is not a Buckley record, nor (according to one
court) is information about a student obtained from an external source
such as a newspaper article.3° Moreover, to be a Buckley record,
student information does not have to be in the official "student file";
it may, for example, be in a teacher's desk, nurse's office, or principal's
file.
Four kinds of school documents are explicitly excluded from the
definition of "records" under Buckley. First, records under Buckley do
not include "sole possession notes."31  These are notes (such as a
school counselor's notes of a treatment session) prepared by a single
school employee which are neither accessible to, nor actually accessed
by,32 anyone except the employee or the employee's substitute,
including other school employees. Second, for students aged 18 and
over or in higher education only, records under Buckley do not include
26. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(a)(4); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3. An invoice from a school's attorney
naming the student who was the subject of a special education hearing is a record under Buckley.
See Letter of March 15, 1991, 17 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. LAW REP. (IDELR)
701 (FPRO 1991). But see Red and Black Publ. Co., Inc. v. Board of Regents, 427 S.E.2d 257,
261 (Ga. 1993) (suggesting that university student records kept at its Office of Judicial Programs
and which are about nonacademic discipline rather than "individual student academic
performance, financial aid, or scholastic probation" are not Buckley records). In direct contrast
to the Red and Black court's definition of records, and rejecting public comments it received on
the matter, the Department of Education correctly maintains that Buckley governs all records of
students, specifically including records of school disciplinary proceedings. See 60 Fed. Reg. 3464,
3464-65 (1995) (statement included in comments on new Buckley regulations).
27. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (1996) (lists the categories of personally identifiable information).
28. For a discussion of Buckley and other privacy-related concerns involved in computerized
school (and other) records, see Tremper and Small, supra note 3, at 841.
29. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.3; MR by RR v. Lincolnwood Bd. of Educ., 843 F. Supp 1236
(N.D. 11. 1994) (videotape of special education student made by school without parent's consent
was considered a record, and its admission in special education hearing did not violate Buckley).
30. See Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding that while
principal's seizure of student newspaper with article critical of another student was not
unconstitutional, possible Buckley violation did not provide additional authority for seizure since
information in article had source independent of student's school records).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (1996). Apparently, this is also
the case under Section 504. See Millis, Mass. Public Schools, 21 IDELR 1064, 1066 (OCR 1994)
(holding that teacher's notes of meeting between student and another student are not accessible
under Section 504 or the ADA).
32. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
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health treatment records accessible only to treatment staff, even if not
sole possession notes.33 Access is available, however, to a treatment
professional of the student's choosing.34 Third, as a result of recent
amendments to the statute and regulations, Buckley records do not
include records created and maintained for law enforcement purposes
by a law enforcement unit within a school.36 Finally, information
about former students after they have left a school (for example,
accomplishments of an alumnae) are not Buckley records.3
C. "Parents" Under Buckley
Buckley gives rights to "parents." It defines "parents" broadly to
include caretakers who are not biological parents, as well as adult
students themselves.3" Under Buckley, "parent" includes any parent
(including noncustodial parents unless there is a court order or law
specifically to the contrary)39 or persons "acting as a parent in the
absence of a [natural] parent" (guardian, stepparent, grandparent,
etc.).40 Buckley "parent" rights are transferred to students at the age
of 18 or when they enroll in a higher education institution.4 Thus,
college and adult students (and former students) have the right to
access their own records. In discussions that follow, the term "parent"
refers to persons with Buckley rights, including adult and college
students.
33. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4XB)(iv); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
34. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3; 34 C.F.R. § 99.10(f).
35. A law enforcement unit is one that is charged with enforcing laws, or maintaining school
safety and security. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.8(a)(1). Law enforcement units may also perform other
tasks such as investigations for school discipline purposes. See id. § 99.8(a)(2). However, records
created only for these nonlaw enforcement purposes would be Buckley records. See id. §
99.8(b)(2)(ii). Hence, school security staff without any specific law enforcement authority can be
subject to this exception. However, only records made at least in part for law enforcement
purposes are not Buckley records. See id.
36. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 99.8.
37. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
38. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.3-99.5.
39. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.4.
40. 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
41. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(d); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.3, 99.5). Thus, presumably when a student
accelerates her education and enters college at a young age, her parents' Buckley rights transfer
to her. See, e.g., Lynn Daggett Pollins, The Effects of Acceleration on the Social and Emotional
Development of Gifted Students, in ACADEMIC PRECOCITY: ASPECTS Of ITS DEVELOPMENT
160-178 (Camilla Benbow & Julian Stanley eds., 1983) (examining mental health of twenty-one
students in college at aged fifteen or younger).
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D. Right to Access Records Under Buckley
Buckley gives parents, upon request, the right to access their
child's records within a "reasonable" time-no later than forty-five
days after request." Access does not generally include the right to a
copy of record. Parents are entitled to a copy of their child's records
only if denying the copy "would effectively prevent the parent from
exercising the right to inspect and review the records."43  In most
cases, schools may charge parents a modest copy fee." Access does
include the right to "reasonable" explanations and interpretation of
records, for example, a conference with a teacher about a report card
grade.4" Access rights may not be waived, except by older students
who may waive access to letters of recommendation.46
E. Confidentiality of Records as to Third Parties
In general, third parties cannot access student records without
written parent consent.47 It is equally as prohibited under Buckley to
disclose information contained in student records orally as it is to
disclose the records themselves.4" Under most circumstances, written,
dated consent of a parent is required to release student records.49 The
consent must specify the records, the person to whom they are to be
released, and the reason for the release. 0 When records are released
pursuant to written consent, the parents and student are entitled to a
copy (for a fee) of the released records upon request.51 The many
exceptions to the consent requirement are described in detail at 34
C.F.R. § 99.31. Schools may, but are not required to,52 disclose
student records without consent in the following circumstances:
42. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 99.10(b).
43. 34 C.F.R. § 99.10(d). See also Huntsville, Ala. Sch. Dist., 24 IDELR 82, 83 (FPCO
1996). Presumably, this would occur primarily when a parent lives too far away to come to school
to view records.
44. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.11(b) (A fee may not be charged where doing so "would effectively
prevent a parent from exercising Buckley rights.").
45. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.10(c).
46. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(C)(iii), (D); 34 C.F.R. § 99.12(b)(3).
47. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3(b) (1996).
48. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (defining "disclosure" as including the oral or other release of
information contained in records).
49. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 99.30(a).
50. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 99.30(b).
51. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.30(c). Normally, a school may charge a fee for this copy.
52. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(b).
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a. To other officials or employees of the school officials who have
a legitimate educational interest in the records; 3
b. To a school in which the student seeks to enroll, after advance
notice to the parent;54
c. When the records are certain "less-private" ones designated as
"Directory information"; 5
d. To juvenile justice authorities to help serve students prior to
adjudication; 6
e. In response to a federal grand jury or other subpoena issued for
a law enforcement purpose; 7
f. In response to any other subpoena or court order, with notice to
the parent;58
g. To federal and state education authorities (and the U.S. Comp-
troller General) for audit and evaluation purposes (e.g., special
education compliance audits);5 9
h. In connection with the student's financial aid, as needed for
financial aid purposes;6"
i. To educational organizations (such as ETS) conducting studies
for test development purposes, student aid, or improving instruc-
tion; 61
j. To accrediting organizations for accreditation purposes; 62
k. To parents of adult or higher education students who are
declared by that parent as a dependent on federal income tax
returns;63
1. To students themselves;64
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31.
54. 34 C.F.R. § 99.34(a).
55. 34 C.F.R. § 99.34.
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(E). For a case detailing problems in providing education to
incarcerated students, see Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773 (D.S.C. 1995).
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(J); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31 (a)(9).
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B). See Francois v. Univ. of the District of Columbia, 788 F.
Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1992) (Buckley and Section 1983 claims filed by student because school
registrar complied with U.S. Attorney subpoena and brought educational records to student's trial
on drug charges without providing advance notice to student.). See also 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(9)(i).
59. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(b)(1)(C); (b)(3); (b)(5); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.31(a)(3), 99.35.
60. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(D) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(4)(i) (1996).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(F); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(6)(i).
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(G); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(7).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(H); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(8). Note that parents in these cir-
cumstances do not have a right to such information; it is up to schools to decide whether to
disclose to them without student consent.
64. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.5(b); 99.31(a)(11).
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m. In a health or safety emergency, to "appropriate parties"6 as
necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or others.
This exception is to be narrowly interpreted; 66
n. For records of higher education agencies only, results of school
discipline proceedings to alleged victims of crimes of violence.67
When schools are asked to release or when they actually release
nondirectory information to persons other than the parent or student
or other employees in the school system without written parent
consent,6 the school must maintain a written log. 69  When records
are released to such an outsider, the person receiving the records must
be notified of his obligation not to disclose the records to anyone else
without written parent consent, except as permitted by Buckley.70
The receiver of the records must maintain his own written access
log.7" If the receiver violates Buckley with regard to the released
records, the releasing school must deny records access to the receiver
for at least five years.72
E Challenges to Records
Parents may ask the school to amend records that they believe are
inaccurate, misleading, or that invade the privacy rights of students. 73
Hearings are available to challenge the accuracy of recorded grades,7 4
but not their fairness.75  The school must respond to such requests
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(I); 34 C.F.R. § 99.36(a).
66. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(1); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.31(a)(10), 99.36(b). See, e.g., Irvine, Cal.
Unified Sch. Dist., 23 IDELR 1077, 1077-78 (FPCO 1996) (finding student's nonurgent medical
condition and associated safety concerns is not emergency justifying sharing records with student's
doctor without parent consent).
67. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(6); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(13). Crimes of violence are defined at
18 U.S.C. § 16.
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 99.32(d) (1996).
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4).
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 99.33.
71. Id.
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(4)(B).
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 99.20(a). Former language allowing challenges
because records invaded rights other than privacy was deleted in 1994. See 20 U.S.C.S.
§ 1232g(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
74. See Lewin v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, 910 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (E.D. Va.
1996).
75. Tarka v. Cunningham, 917 F.2d 890, 891-92 (5th Cir. 1990). See also 120 CONG. REC.
at 39,862 (May 12, 1974) (joint statement in support of Buckley) (Buckley hearing may be used
to challenge improperly recorded grade, but not to contest fairness of grade assigned to student's
performance); 140 CONG. REC. at S10291 (July 28, 1994) (Buckley hearings also may not be used
to challenge appropriateness of IEP's).
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within a "reasonable time."7 6 If the school does not agree to amend
the records, the school must tell the parent of her right to seek an
internal hearing (that is, one where the hearing officer is a school
employee who is not directly interested in the outcome)" to challenge
records." The hearing must be held within a reasonable time of the
request,79 include written notice "reasonably in advance""0 to the
parent of the particulars of the hearing,"' and provide the parent with
a "full and fair opportunity to present evidence" and to representation
by an attorney or other person at their own expense if they wish. 2
The hearing must result in a written decision, issued within a
reasonable time after the hearing. 3 The decision "must be based
solely on the evidence at the hearing, and must include a summary of
the evidence and the reasons for the decision."84
If the parent wins the hearing, the school must accordingly amend
the records and so inform the parent in writing.5 If the parent loses
the hearing, the decision is final and there is no provision for an
appeal. However, the parent may place a statement in her child's
records explaining what she finds to be inaccurate, misleading, or
violative of the privacy rights of students.8 6 The statement becomes
part of the child's records, to be released whenever the challenged
records are released. 7
G. Notice to Parents
Buckley also requires schools to notify parents of current students
(as well as adult and higher education students) annually and "effec-
tively" of their Buckley rights.8 8  Notice to former students is not
required. Parents who have a first language other than English must
76. 34 C.F.R. § 99.20(b) (1996).
77. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.22(c).
78. See id.
79. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.22(a).
80. 34 C.F.R. § 99.22(b).
81. See id. (notice must include "date, time and place of hearing").
82. 34 C.F.R. § 99.22(d).
83. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.22(e).
84. 34 C.F.R. § 99.22(f).
85. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.20(b).
86. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(a)(2 ); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.21-22. This process is somewhat similar to
that when entries in credit records are contested.
87. See id.
88. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(e) (1994) (language added in 1994 to require "effective" noti-




be "effectively notified." 9 Notice to parents must include notice of
their right to (1) inspect and review their child's records; (2) challenge
records; (3) consent before records are released to third parties, except
as provided by the statute; and (4) file a complaint with the Family
Policy Compliance Office (FPC) °
Although not specifically required as part of the parent notice, if
a school intends to designate certain information as directory, the
annual notification should note this decision, list the types of directory
information, and explain to parents the deadline and process for
objecting.9
H. Conflicts Between Buckley and State Laws
If a school cannot comply with Buckley because of a conflict with
state or local law, it must notify the FPC Office within forty-five
days.92 The statute is silent as to any required follow up by the
Office or action by the school, when such a conflict arises. One court
has suggested, and the FPC Office has stated, that Buckley does not
preempt state laws which conflict with it.93
II. ENFORCEMENT OF BUCKLEY
As an overview, Buckley itself contains two administrative
enforcement provisions. First, a complaint may be made to the FPC
Office, which may investigate the complaint and, if a violation is
found, attempt to informally and voluntarily resolve it.94 Second, the
Office is empowered in limited egregious circumstances to initiate
proceedings to withhold federal education funds from a school
district.9" As the discussion that follows will show, attempts to create
a private cause of action for Buckley violations have been singularly.
unsuccessful. In addition, common law tort claims appear equally
lacking in potential. One indirect means of enforcement, however, is
the potential for disciplining (and in some cases even discharging)
school employees who violate Buckley.
89. 34 C.F.R. § 99.7(d).
90. 34 C.F.R. § 99.7(a).
91. See id. Parents must receive this notice in some format.
92. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.61.
93. See Maynard, 876 F. Supp. at 1108; South Dakota, 20 IDELR 105, 106 (FPCO 1993).
94. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g); 34 C.F.R. § 99.64(a).
95. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2) and (f); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.62-.67.
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A. Enforcement by the Family Policy Compliance Office
1. FPC Office Complaints
Persons who believe their Buckley rights have been violated may
file a complaint with the FPC Office. 96 Complaints must be filed
within 180 days of the alleged violation or of the time the complainant
knew or reasonably should have known of the violation, unless an
extension of time is granted by the Office.97 The FPC Office notifies
the complainant if the complaint is untimely or otherwise defective.9
When a complaint is received, the Office will notify the school of
the complaint99 (although providing an actual copy of the complaint
is apparently not required)' 0 and will request a written response.'0 '
The parties may elect to provide additional information to the FPC
Office.'0 2  The Office will then investigate the complaint, 10 3 make
a finding, and notify the complainant and the school in writing of its
findings and reasons.'O°  There is no hearing. 1°5  Buckley also pro-
vides no deadline for the Office to process complaints, and resolutions
can take many months' 6
If the FPC Office finds that the school has violated Buckley, the
Office is empowered only to seek the school's voluntary compliance.
The FPC Office may ask the school to meet certain conditions such as
removing records, or may just tell the school to follow the law, in order
96. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g); 34 C.F.R. § 99.64(a). The Office's address is U.S. Depart-
ment of Education, Washington, D.C., 20202-4605.
97. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.64.
98. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.65(b).
99. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.65(a). Apparently, there is no requirement that schools be promptly
informed of complaints against them. See, e.g., Huntsville, Ala. Sch. Dist., 24 IDELR 82, 82
(FPCO 1996) (four month interval between complaint and notice of complaint to school).
100. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.65(a) (requiring only notice to the schools of "the substance of the
alleged violation").
101. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.62 (1996) (giving the Office authority to require schools to provide
information to resolve complaints). Buckley provides no deadline for responding, and in fact,
there may be no response for some months. See, e.g., Irvine, Cal. Sch. Dist., 23 IDELR 1077
(FPCO 1996) (seven months between notice of complaint to school and the school's response).
102. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.66(a).
103. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.64(b).
104. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.66(b).
105. Note, however, that Buckley requires schools to conduct hearings where records are
challenged. See supra Part I.F. Also note that the statute refers to "adjudication" of complaints,
and limits the locations for "hearings" involving school sanctions by the Department of Education.
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g).
106. See, e.g., Huntsville, Ala. Sch. Dist., 24 IDELR at 82 (February 1996 letter finding
Buckley violation as alleged in parent's June 1994 letter claiming school denied access to
daughter's records).
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to resolve the complaint. 10 7  If the complaint is thus resolved, the
parties are so notified.10 8
2. Termination of Federal Education Funding
In extreme cases, where there is a pattern of violations, °9 and
voluntary compliance has not been achieved, the FPC Office may
initiate proceedings to withdraw federal funds from the school.11
Asserting that Buckley bars disclosure of requested records is not
sufficient grounds to withhold federal funds."' In any event, a
school is entitled to a hearing before funds are withheld.' 1 2 Appar-
ently, the Office has never attempted to withdraw federal funds
because of Buckley violations. 3 The statute and regulations desig-
nate a Review Board but do not assign them any specific Buckley-
related responsibilities.
Several courts have noted the lack of remedy Buckley provides to
aggrieved persons. One court noted that "neither the statute nor its
regulations give a specific remedy that would be beneficial to the
plaintiff.'"' 4  Another court used sharper language, finding that
"[T]he complete inadequacy of the Secretary's regulations, coupled
with the statute's failure to require more complete relief for aggrieved
individuals," means that requiring exhaustion of Buckley remedies as
a prerequisite to a Section 1983 claim "would have the effect of'exhausting' the complainant without any possibility of meaningful
enforcement.""' 5  Accordingly, complainants have attempted to
enforce Buckley through private causes of action.
107. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.66(c); see id. at 83 (requesting assurances from school of
compliance, and notice to staff of obligations in order to resolve complaint); Inine, 23 IDELR
at 1078 (same).
108. 34 C.F.R. § 99.67(b).
109. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A).
110. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2) and (f) (1994); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.62-67 (1996).
111. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232i. There is an exception to this rule for refusal to provide records
to financial aid authorities. Id.
112. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g); 34 C.F.R. § 99.60(c). See also 34 C.F.R. section 78
regarding the GEPA Review Board which conducts hearings when federal funding may be
withdrawn.
113. There are no reported decisions so indicating.
114. Belanger v. Nashua Sch. Dist., 856 F. Supp. 40, 47 (D.N.H. 1994) (partly for this
reason, finding a Section 1983 claim available and not requiring exhaustion of Buckley
administrative remedies).
115. Krebs v. Rutgers, 797 F. Supp. 1246, 1257 (D.N.J. 1992). See also Maynard, 876 F.
Supp. at 1107 (Buckley enforcement mechanisms "do[] not provide a remedy to the plaintiff, and
in fact... exacerbate the community's financial burden.").
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B. Private Cause of Action Denied
Early in Buckley's history, a series of attempts were made to create
a private cause of action under it. However, courts are unanimous in
holding that, primarily because of an absence of legislative intent to do
so, Buckley itself does not provide the right to file a private lawsuit to
challenge alleged violations.116
C. State Law Tort Claims
Another possible enforcement mechanism for redressing Buckley
violations is state law tort claims, such as those sounding in negligence.
While there are few reported decisions examining negligence claims for
violation of Buckley, one can predict the likely outcome based on
existing tort doctrine and the nature of Buckley violations. The first
part of the negligence prima facie case, a breach of the duty of
reasonable care on the part of those who violate Buckley, seems easily
provable." 7  However, nominal damages are not available in negli-
gence, and the requisite showing of particular types of harm seems
unlikely. The harm most likely resulting from a Buckley violation is
mental upset. Most jurisdictions do not permit recovery for negligent-
ly inflicted mental harm. Instead, under the majority approach mental
harm negligently inflicted can be recovered only if incident to physical
contact (which seems unlikely in the case of Buckley violations), or if
the mental upset results in physical symptoms such as an ulcer.118
116. See, e.g., Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102, 102 (5th Cir. 1988); Fay v. South Colonie
Central Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21, 33 (2nd Cir. 1986); Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d
1267, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1977); Odom v. Columbia Univ., 906 F. Supp. 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); Krebs, 797 F. Supp. at 1256; Francois v. Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 788 F. Supp. 31,
33 (D.D.C. 1992). For the general standard for inferring a private right of action under a statute,
see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
117. Evidence of custom among educators with regard to student records, as well as expert
testimony by educators with regard to best educational practices in the area, could both be used
to prove breach of duty. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A (1965 & Supp. 1996)
(custom); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 33 (4th
ed. 1984 & Supp. 1996) (custom). Breach of Buckley itself would not, however, establish a breach
of the duty of reasonable care. Breach of statute can in some cases conclusively establish a breach
of duty under a doctrine sometimes referred to as "negligence per se," but this doctrine requires
violation of a(n) (often criminal) state statute establishing a safety standard. See Mucklow v. John
Marshall Law School, 531 N.E.2d 941, 947 (Ill. App. 1988) (a Buckley violation does not
establish negligence per se because Buckley is not a statute "designed to protect human life or
property"); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285, 286; KEETON ET AL.,
supra, § 36.
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A; KEETON ET AL., supra note 117,
§ 54. Of course, other obstacles to negligence claims exist as well. For example, in the case of
alleged violations by public schools, state law may provide governmental immunity to such
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Other state law tort claims seem equally unlikely to succeed. For
example, tort claims sounding in intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IED) require not only outrageous behavior, performed
intentionally or recklessly by the defendant, but also that the plaintiff
have suffered "severe emotional distress," as usually demonstrated
through physical symptoms or the seeking of medical or psychological
treatment." 9 Buckley violations are unlikely to be deemed outra-
geous, or, for the reasons described above with respect to negligence
claims, to result in severe emotional distress.
Private school plaintiffs might try a breach of contract claim.
Private school students and their schools do have a contractual
relationship, in which tuition moneys are exchanged for educational
services. The terms of this contractual relationship are inferred from
school publications such as the catalog, admissions materials and the
student handbook. To the extent a private school has an annual parent
notice regarding student records, as Buckley requires, a court may find
that notice to be part of the student-school contract. As in tort,
however, the likely harm is the wrong sort to be compensated on a
contract theory. 20
One reported case involving a defamation claim based on alleged
Buckley violations was thrown out for failure to plead specific
facts. 2' More generally, defamation claims based on improper
disclosure of student records are likely not viable. Defamation law
requires the plaintiff to prove the statements about her are false.12
Disclosed student records would normally involve true, though
allegedly private, information.
Finally, tort claims asserting invasion of privacy may fail because
the disclosure of student records would not be "highly offensive to a
reasonable person," as is required by such claims. Further, the records
may be "of legitimate concern to the public," which defeats the tort of
invasion of privacy. 23
defendants.
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46; KEETON ET AL., supra note 117, § 12.
120. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981 & Supp. 1996)
(recovery for emotional disturbance in contract is barred under most circumstances).
121. See Norris v. Bd. of Educ., 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1462-63 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (granting
summary judgment to defendant).
122. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (holding that truth
is not a defense; plaintiff has burden of proving statement is false).
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D; see also Culver by Culver v. Port
Allegany Reporter Argus, 598 A.2d 54, 55 (Penn. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that invasion of
privacy claim against newspaper properly dismissed because special education student's evaluation
costs were a matter of public concern).
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D. Grounds for Employee Discipline
Violation of student records laws by a school employee may be
cause for discipline of that employee, up to and including dismiss-
al. 124  Buckley is no defense to reporting concerns about students to
other school officials when appropriate. 23
124. See, e.g., Henderson v. Huecker, 744 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding
dismissal of counselor at state rehabilitation center in part for attaching confidential student
information to the complaint in her lawsuit where student names could have been edited out with
no harm to counselor's claim); Downie v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 141, 367 N.W.2d 913, 917
(Minn. App. 1985) (upholding dismissal of tenured school guidance counselor for, among other
things, breaching confidentiality of students whom he counseled, which the court found to be "the
most serious of the charges and certainly the conduct which has the most potential for causing
long-lasting harm to students"). Discipline of employees for Buckley violations must be
consistent to be upheld. See Jager v. Ramond Bd. of Educ., 444 N.W.2d 21, 26 (S.D. 1989)
(reversing a decision to not renew a teacher for Buckley violations where another employee was
not disciplined for any of three Buckley violations).
125. See Pesce v. J, Sterling Morton High Sch. Dist. 201, 651 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ill.
1986), aff'd, 830 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding five day suspension of school psychologist
for failing to promptly notify school authorities that student was contemplating suicide after a
sexual encounter with a teacher); Gottlob v. Connecticut State Univ., 1996 WL 57087 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1996) (no discussion of Buckley, but upholding discharge of university employee who
refused to disclose information regarding student gambling to employer, as against free speech
claim).
Of course, Buckley is no bar to reporting of the sort urged in Pesce, since it would have been
to other school officials with a legitimate educational interest in the student's mental health. See
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A). More troubling is the argument that Buckley prohibits the reporting
of suspected child abuse. Reporting is mandated by state statute for certain school employees in
all fifty states as a condition of federal child abuse prevention funds under 42 U.S.C. § 510(a)
(1994). Buckley is also alleged to prohibit the reporting of suspected criminal activity to law
enforcement authorities.
With regard to reporting suspected child abuse, and under earlier versions of Buckley, pre-
1974 child abuse reporting mandates were a means of authorized disclosure without consent.
Before 1994, Buckley permitted unconsented-to disclosures pursuant to pre-1974 state laws. As
of 1994, however, this exception was eliminated. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(E), amended by Act
of Oct. 20, 1994, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1232g(b)(1)(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
If no student records are involved (perhaps instead, a teacher has observed bruises and asked
the student about them, but recorded nothing, or a teacher has observed an apparent drug sale
by a student but recorded nothing) Buckley would not prohibit the reporting. Moreover, where
the records of suspected criminal activity are created by a schools' law enforcement unit, they
would not be Buckley records and reporting to the police would be permissible. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 99.8. Where, however, as is often the case, Buckley records are involved, Buckley contains no
explicit permission to make a report. While it is the author's experience that school employees
can and do make such reports on the presumption that Buckley would not be interpreted to
prohibit them, Buckley should be amended to permit such reports, as is urged in the companion
article. See Daggett, supra note 9.
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III. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS TO REDRESS BUCKLEY VIOLATIONS
Where a public school violates Buckley, a civil rights lawsuit may
be possible.'26 Several courts have held that a Section 1983 action
may be brought to vindicate Buckley violations, and the specter of such
claims has been touted as the best way to enforce Buckley.'27 In fact,
numerous Section 1983 claims alleging Buckley violations have been
brought in the last ten years. 2 ' Of these cases, one court awarded
nominal damages of one dollar.'29 Another issued a preliminary
injunction against a university practice which likely violated Buck-
ley.'3 ' No reported decisions awarded actual damages or attorneys'
fees.
126. This Article discusses Section 1983 claims, which form by far the bulk of Buckley-
based civil rights claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). It should be noted, however, that under
narrowly defined circumstances, a Section 1985 civil rights claim may be available. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (1994) (prohibiting conspiracies to deprive persons of their civil rights). Where a school
and its agents are the only alleged violators, a Section 1985 claim will be unavailable, as a school
cannot conspire with itself. See Rothman v. Emory Univ., 828 F. Supp. 537, 539 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(dismissing Buckley-based Section 1985 claim against university because "university cannot
conspire with itself"). Moreover, Section 1985 requires class-based animus not generally present
in Buckley violations. See, e.g., Maynard, 876 F. Supp. at 1009 (dismissing Buckley-based
Section 1985 claim for this reason).
In the event that student records were singled out for adverse treatment motivated by race,
a Buckley-based Section 1981 claim may be available. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 858 F. Supp.
340, 344-345 (N.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 160 F.R.D. 18 (1995).
127. See, e.g., Maynard, 876 F. Supp. at 1107; Cullens v. Bemis, 979 F.2d 850 (6th Cir.
1992) (unpublished decision); Tarka, 891 F.2d at 102 (but affirming summary judgment for
school on 1983 claim where plaintiff was not a student); Fay, 802 F.2d at 33-34 (affirming
judgment under Section 1983 and state law for joint custodial parent for Buckley violation where
school refused to permit access to child's records and send copies of school notices, and remanding
for determination of amount, if any, of compensatory damages); Gundlach v. Reinstein, 924 F.
Supp. 684, 690 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Doe v. Alfred, 906 F. Supp. 1092 (S.D.W.V. 1995), appeal
dismissed, 79 F.3d 1141 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing, without discussion, to dismiss Buckley-based
Section 1983 claim); Doe v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 918 F. Supp. 181 (D. Tenn. 1994);
Oberstellar for Oberstallar v. Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist., 874 F. Supp. 146, 149 (S.D. Tex.
1994); Belanger v. Nashua, Noltog Sch. Dist., 856 F. Supp. 40 (D.N.H. 1994); Krebs, 797 F.
Supp. at 1256; Norwood v. Slammons, 788 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Ark 1991). Cf. Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (Section 1983 permits claims which are based not on alleged
constitutional violations, but on alleged violations of federal statutes.).
One court has rejected Buckley-based Section 1983 claims. Norris v. Bd. of Educ. of
Greenwood Community Sch. Corp., 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1464-65 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (holding that
Buckley's administrative enforcement mechanism, the FPC Office complaint, is exclusive and bars
a claim under Section 1983; also rejecting a Section 1983 claim based on constitutional privacy
deprivation).
128. See supra list of cases at note 127.
129. See Bauer v. Kincaid, 759 F. Supp. 575, 595 (W.D. Mo. 1991); see also Fay, 802 F.2d
at 33 (remanding trial court's award of nominal damages to allow plaintiff to prove actual
damages).
130. See Krebs, 797 F. Supp. at 1262.
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A. Section 1983 Claims in General
1. Persons Who May Be Sued
A variety of persons and entities may be sued under Section 1983,
including state governments and agencies, local governments and
agencies, public school districts and boards of education, and public
colleges and universities, as well as agents, officials and employees of
all of these entities. 131  Federal entities and employees may not be
sued under Section 1983 but may instead be liable under a similar
"Bivens" action created under federal common law.132  Remedies
against some types of defendants are, however, limited under Section
1983. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from awarding
damages against state governments and agencies and state employees
in their official capacity. 33  Punitive damages are not available
against municipal defendants. 13 4 Section 1983 also limits theories of
liability against certain types of defendants. Government entities, for
example a board of education or a school district, will be liable only if
the violation is pursuant to an official policy or custom of that
government entity.135  Generally, the actions of an individual school
district employee, even a high-ranking one, do not amount to a school
district policy or custom. 136  Finally, supervisory employees such as
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
132. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). A Bivens claim is markedly similar to a Section 1983 claim, but is brought
under common law instead of statute.
133. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 3
F.3d 1482 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated, 19 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that a state university
president has Eleventh Amendment immunity). The Eleventh Amendment may also limit the
authority of state courts to award damages against these defendants. See Livingood v. Meece, 477
N.W.2d 183 (N.D. 1991). Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, may be waived. See, e.g.,
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (no waiver under IDEA). In any event, Section 1983
defendants sued in state court are likely to seek removal to federal court in order to raise the
Eleventh Amendment.
134. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
135. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. See also City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
382 (1989) ("[T]he first inquiry in any case alleging liability [of a government entity] under
§ 1983 is . . .whether there is a direct causal link between a policy or custom, and the alleged
deprivation."). "Deliberate indifference" by a municipality to the violation of federal rights must
also be proved. Board of County Comm'ns of Bryan County, Ok. v. Brown, 65 USLW 4286,
4288-89 (U.S. Apr. 28, 1997).
136. See, e.g., Ware v. Unified Sch. No. 492, 902 F.2d 815, 820 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding
that superintendent of schools does not make Board of Education employment policy or custom
and Board of Education cannot delegate its employment authority); Landstrom v. Barrington Sch.
Dist. 220, 739 F. Supp. 441, 449 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding that although school principals make
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school administrators cannot be liable under Section 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory. 37  Supervisors can only be liable for
subordinates' conduct that they encouraged, condoned, or to which
they acquiesced.13
2. Prima Facie Case
Plaintiffs must prove the following elements to make out a prima
facie case under Section 1983:
-the defendant acted under color of state law; 139
-the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind, if any
(generally more than ordinary negligence);14
-causing14 1
-a deprivation of a right under federal law or the constitution. 142
Violations of federal statutes (at least those enacted under Congress'
spending authority) are actionable under Section 1983 only if the
statute "unambiguously confer[s] an enforceable right upon [its]
beneficiaries. 143
policy for their school buildings, principal does not establish school district policy). Cf. Jett v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737-38 (1989) (noting that school district policy maker
determination is an issue of state law and may vary from issue to issue); moreover, even if a
school district employee is a policymaker for the district, that employee's acts do not render the
district liable unless the district was the "moving force" behind the injury. Board of County
Comm'ns of Bryan County, Ok. v. Brown, 65 USLW 4286, 4288-89 (U.S. Apr. 28, 1997).
137. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation,
Vicarious Liability of Superior under 42 U.S.C. § 1983for Subordinate's Acts in Deprivation of Civil
Rights, 51 A.L.R. FED. 285 (1981).
138. See, e.g., Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988). Deliberate
indifference on the part of superiors to, for example, obligations to train subordinates, may be
required. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 388.
139. For a discussion of the under color of state law requirement, see Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil, Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
140. Section 1983 does not contain an independent state of mind requirement; the state of
mind required for the underlying violation is to be considered. For example, in Section 1983
claims alleging procedural due process violations, more than ordinary negligence must be proven.
See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329 (1986). Municipalities will not be liable unless
deliberate indifference to the underlying violation is proved. See Brown, 491 U.S. at 737-38.
141. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Mount Healthy
City Bd. Of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (setting out standard when there are multiple
causes); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
142. Although most Section 1983 claims allege constitutional violations, it is clear that
claims alleging federal statutory violations may also be brought. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1 (1980) (finding that Section 1983 permits claims which are based, not on alleged
constitutional violations, but on alleged violations of federal statutes).
143. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992) (holding that a Section 1983 claim is
unavailable under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, which merely requires"reasonable efforts" by states).
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3. Defenses
There are several affirmative defenses. State defendants in federal
court cases may plead Eleventh Amendment immunity.' Individual
defendants may raise the defense of good faith (also sometimes referred
to as "qualified" or "official") immunity.'45 A defendant has good
faith immunity if her actions do not violate a clearly established right
about which a reasonable person would have known.'46 In due
process-based claims, an adequate state remedy defeats the Section
1983 claim.'47 On the other hand, administrative exhaustion is
generally not required. 4 '
4. Remedies
If a plaintiff prevails before a judge or jury on a Section 1983
claim, a wide variety of remedies are available. Nominal'49 and
compensatory 5 ° damages are available, including "inferred" damages,
where the jury is asked to estimate the size of the plaintiff's injury (for
example, because of a due process violation) without specific proof.'
Punitive damages are also available to remedy intentional and reckless
violations."5 2 However, punitive damages are not available against a
municipality or municipal employees sued in their official capacity.1 3
Plaintiffs who "prevail"'5 4 may also have their reasonable attorneys'
fees reimbursed by the defendant.'55
144. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
145. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1974) (school board members have good faith immunity).
146. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-819.
147. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
148. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
149. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
150. See id.
151. See id. at 264 n.22. The amount of the presumed damages award must, however,
depend on the magnitude of the plaintiffs injury rather than the importance of the right that was
violated. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 302 (1986).
152. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); Carey, 435 U.S. at 257 n.l1.
153. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
154. "Prevail" means to "succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some
of the benefit the party sought in bringing the suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429
(1983).
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1996). Attorneys' fees are available even if only nominal
damages are awarded. See, e.g., Dahlem v. Bd. Educ., 901 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1990).
Attorneys fees may also be awarded against a state or other party with Eleventh Amendment
immunity where prospective injunctive relief is granted. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978).
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B. Section 1983 Claims Asserting Buckley Violations
To understand the applicability of Section 1983 claims to Buckley
grievances, and specifically why such claims have not been more
successful, it is instructive to work through each aspect of a hypotheti-
cal Section 1983 claim alleging a Buckley violation. Assume, for
example, that a teacher returns a student's exam marked with a grade
of "D" and blurts out, in front of the class, "I can't believe someone
with an IQ of 130 [cannot] do better than a D." The student is
pleased to learn her IQ is high,'56 but upset that it, and her exam
grade, are now matters of public knowledge.
1. Persons Who May Be Sued
The plaintiff parent157 might file a Section 1983 claim against the
teacher, the teacher's supervisors such as the principal and superinten-
dent of schools, the board of education and its members, and the
school district itself. If the attorney is creative, state defendants such
as the state department of education may also be joined. Initially,
several defendants are likely to move to dismiss the claims against
them. As discussed above in Part III.A, the state and institutional
defendants, the school district and board of education, will likely make
one or more of three following arguments: (1) the alleged violation was
not pursuant to official policy; (2) they are immune under the Eleventh
Amendment; or (3) they cannot be found responsible on a vicarious
liability or respondeat superior basis. Assuming the school district has
annual parent notice regarding student records as Buckley requires, 158
that this notice prohibits disclosures such as the teacher's, and that
there is no pattern of Buckley violations in the school district which
might amount to an official policy or practice, the institutional
defendants are likely to be dismissed under Monell.'59
156. On a Wechsler IQ test, for example, a score of 130 is two standard deviations above
the mean, putting this student at about the 98th percentile rank.
157. Of course, if the student is aged eighteen or over, she herself would be the proper
plaintiff.
158. See supra Part I.G.
159. See, e.g., Krebs, 797 F. Supp. at 1258 (numerous instances of faculty distribution of
rosters with student social security numbers for attendance purposes, without corrective action
from university administration, constitutes a practice; however, isolated instance of posting grades
by names does not); Francois, 788 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 1992) (alleged Buckley violation where
school, under subpoena, released records of indicted student to U.S. Attorney without notice to
student does not state Section 1983 claim where there is no allegation the violation was pursuant
to school custom or policy).
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Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment does not extend to
municipal defendants which, according to most states, includes local
school districts.' 60  However, institutional state defendants, and state
employees sued in their official capacity, will have Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity from suits for damages in federal courts.161  Of
course, because suits for prospective injunctive relief would not
implicate the Eleventh Amendment, 6 2 claims for injunctive relief
could be maintained against these defendants.
Finally, supervisory defendants (such as the principal and
superintendent of schools) and employer defendants (such as the
teacher's employing school district) cannot be held liable on a
respondeat superior basis.'63 Only supervisors who participate in or
condone the violation will be liable under Section 1983.1' Similarly,
board of education members cannot be liable under Section 1983 unless
they approved the conduct.'65
In short, claims are likely to be dismissed against almost all of the
defendants, except for the teacher.'66
160. See Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277 (1977) (applying
Ohio law, school district acts as political subdivision of the state and thus has no Eleventh
Amendment immunity); Gundlach v. Reinstein, 924 F. Supp. 684, 691 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Doe v.
Knox Co. Bd. of Educ., 918 F. Supp. 182, 183 (E.D. Ky. 1996). But see Belanger v. Madera
Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 255 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that because of level of state control
of education in California, local board of education does have Eleventh Amendment immunity).
On the other hand, a state university likely has Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g.,
Hall v. Hawaii, 791 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1986) (University of Hawaii immune).
161. See, e.g., Cullens v. Bemis, 979 F.2d 850, 857 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished decision)
(dismissing 1983 claims claiming Buckley violation against state defendants under Eleventh
Amendment); Fay, 802 F.2d at 33-34 (dismissing claims against state Commissioner of Education
because of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
162. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979); Exparte Young, 209 U.S 123 (1908).
163. See Oberstellar v. Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist., 874 F. Supp. 146, 149 (S.D. Tex.
1994) (holding that defendant's coach and athletic director cannot be liable under Section 1983
on respondeat superior theory for alleged Buckley violation by secretary who wrote letter about
student to newspaper).
164. See Cullens, 979 F.2d at 850 (holding that no respondeat superior liability is possible
in Section 1983 claim based on alleged Buckley violation; supervisor liable only if she "condoned,
encouraged, or participated in the alleged misconduct"); Krebs, 797 F. Supp. at 1261 (refusing to
permit amendment of complaint to add university president as defendant, where no allegations
he knew of or "acquiesced in" alleged Buckley violations).
165. See Maynard v. Greater Hoyt Sch. Dist. No. 61-4, 876 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (1995)
(dismissing claims against school district, and Board of Education members in official capacity,
because alleged actions not pursuant to official policy or custom).
166. As discussed supra in Part III.A.3, the teacher may move to dismiss the case on the
basis of the affirmative defense of good faith immunity. As good faith immunity is an issue of
law, it may be resolved without going to trial.
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2. Prima Facie Case
To make out a prima facie case against the teacher and any
remaining defendants, the plaintiff would first have to prove that the
defendant acted under color of state law. For claims against public
schools and their employees and officials, proving this element would
be easy. Claims against private schools and their employees and
officials would fail here, however. Even private schools which receive
substantial federal funding do not act under color of state law for
Section 1983 purposes.167 The unavailability of Section 1983 claims,
and the lack of a private remedy thus leave private school students
with no way to challenge Buckley violations in court, nor with an
administrative hearing conducted by an independent official.16
Next, the plaintiff would have to prove the requisite state of mind.
Section 1983 has no independent state of mind requirement; any
requisite state of mind arises from the state of mind required for the
alleged underlying violation. 69 For example, more than ordinary
negligence is required in Section 1983 claims alleging procedural due
process violations. 7 ° In the case of Buckley violations, the statute
contains no state of mind requirement, but more than negligence may
be required.' 7 '
To complete the prima facie case, the plaintiff would then have to
establish causation and a deprivation of Buckley. Three courts have
found that Buckley does "unambiguously impose enforceable obliga-
tions" on states, and thus held that a Buckley violation is an actionable
statutory deprivation. 172  Because however, some courts have read
167. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) (finding that a private school for
disabled students whose revenue was derived almost exclusively from tuition payments by public
schools did not act under color of state law for Section 1983 purposes); Williams v. Discovery
Day School, 924 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (dismissing Buckley-based Section 1983 claims
against private school and its agents); Odom v. Columbia Univ., 906 F. Supp. 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (dismissing Buckley claim and noting in dicta that Section 1983 claim would be unavailable
because private university does not act under color of state law); Maynard, 876 F. Supp. at 1107
(finding that newspaper reporter and taxpayer defendants are not state actors who can be liable
under Section 1983). Cf. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988)
(holding that a national university athletic association which is largely comprised of public schools
does not act under color of state law).
168. See Cullens, 979 F.2d at 850 (unpublished decision) (no 1983 claim based on alleged
Buckley violation against private college).
169. See supra note 140.
170. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
171. See Cullens, 979 F.2d at 850 (holding that a Section 1983 claim not available where the
complaint that the school lost student's records alleges no more than negligence).
172. See Gundlach v. Reinstein, 924 F. Supp. 684,690 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Maynard, 876 F.
Supp. at 1107; Belanger, 856 F. Supp. at 41-47 (performing a particularly thorough analysis).
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Buckley literally to only require schools to adopt policies regarding
access to and confidentiality of student records, one court has found
that actionable deprivations of Buckley may occur only through school
policy. 173  Alternatively, two courts have suggested that student
records violations may involve deprivations of constitutional privacy
interests."'
In the hypothetical scenario, if the teacher works at a public school,
it should be easy to prove her actions were under color of state law.
The other elements of the prima facie case are less clear. If the court
requires a state of mind worse than ordinary negligence, "blurting out"
student records information may not be sufficient. Similarly, if the
court interprets Buckley as only requiring school policies, then the
individual teacher's violation would not constitute a deprivation.
3. Defenses
The teacher, and any other defendants sued in their individual
capacities, may raise the affirmative defense of good faith immunity.
If the violation of Buckley is a clear one, and there are no other
conflicting laws, the good faith immunity defense seems unlikely to
succeed. Whatever the teacher's actual state of mind, it appears that
a reasonable educator would know about Buckley, which has been the
law for more than twenty years.'75 On the other hand, if Buckley
was violated in order to comply with a conflicting law, good faith
immunity may well exist.
173. See Gundlach, 924 F. Supp. at 690 (performing Suter analysis, finding that "the
requirement placed [by Buckley] on the participating institution is not that it must prevent the
unauthorized release of education records .... but that it cannot improperly release such records
as a matter of policy or practice").
174. See Norris v. Bd. of Educ., 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1465-66 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (finding no
actionable claim arising from the facts before the court); see also Sean R. v. Bd. of Educ. of Town
of Woodbridge, 19 IDELR 173, 174 (D. Conn. 1992).
175. See Doe v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 918 F. Supp. 181, 185 (D. Tenn. 1994)
(refusing to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity Section 1983/Buckley claims against
Superintendent of Schools and Board of Education members). But see Maynard, 876 F. Supp. at
1108 (finding that school board members have qualified immunity in individual capacity for
alleged Buckley violations when they acted pursuant to advice of school attorney and in
accordance with conflicting state law). It would seem especially likely that reasonable special
education employees would be familiar with Buckley, given the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act's (IDEA) requirement for staff training on student records confidentiality. 34
C.F.R. § 300.572(c) (1996). Moreover, state teacher certification requirements may require
knowledge of school legal issues, perhaps specifically including knowledge of student records laws.
See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 180-79-131 (1997) (general knowledge requirements for all
Washington educator certification candidates includes the knowledge of American education law,
including "students ... privacy rights").
[Vol. 21:29
Buckley Amendment
Adequate state remedy is also a defense, but only for Section 1983
claims alleging due process violations. Therefore, it would appear to
be inapplicable to Section 1983 claims alleging Buckley violations.
Moreover, there is no state hearing or civil claim provided by Buckley
for alleged violations of it which might be considered an "adequate
state remedy."t 7 6 However, some states may have state remedies
which may be raised as Section 1983 defenses.'77
Finally, and as is the case with most statute-based Section 1983
claims, administrative exhaustion would likely not be required. 7' In
short, in the hypothetical scenario, the public school teacher defendant
is unlikely to raise a successful affirmative defense.
4. Remedies
As discussed above, persons who surmount these obstacles and
prevail under Section 1983 can recover money damages (including in
some cases pain and suffering and punitive damages), as well as
attorneys' fees from defendants who are found to have violated the
law.'79 Students injured by Buckley violations are unlikely to have
physical injuries, or in most cases, emotional harm which involves
treatment, so normally only nominal damages will be available.' As
stated previously, no reported cases have awarded other than nominal
damages under Section 1983 for Buckley violations. However,
prevailing plaintiffs may be able to recover presumed damages' 8 ' in
the same manner as persons injured by, for example, search and seizure
violations. Moreover, they may in appropriate circumstances recover
punitive damages,8 2 except against municipal defendants. At the
least, nominal damages will be available. Injunctive relief is also a
176. This is in contrast to other federal education statutes such as the IDEA, which requires
a state level administrative hearing for alleged statutory violations. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)
(1994).
177. See Cullens v. Bemis, 979 F.2d at 850 (in case alleging Buckley violation, noting that
adequate state remedy would defeat due process-based 1983 claims in federal court).
178. See Belanger, 856 F. Supp. at 47; Krebs, 797 F. Supp. at 1256-57. Note that attorneys'
fees would also be unavailable for "prevailing" at the administrative level. See North Carolina
Dep't of Trans. v. Crest Street Community Council, 479 U.S. 6 (1986). Of course, given the
absence of a hearing opportunity as part of the Buckley administrative process, hiring a lawyer
to file an FPC Office complaint is probably not a good investment.
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) (availability of attorneys' fees); see supra notes 149-55 and
accompanying text.
180. See Bauer v. Kincaid, 759 F. Supp. 575, 595 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (awarding $1.00
damages). See also Fay, 802 F.2d at 33 (remanding trial court's award of nominal damages to
allow plaintiff to prove actual damages).
181. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
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possibility.'83 Whatever damages or other relief are awarded, reim-
bursement of attorneys' fees may also be claimed. Attorneys' fees need
not be proportionate to the actual damages awarded.184 Again, the
teacher cannot look to her employer for payment of the judgment on
a respondeat superior theory. However, the teacher may have
insurance to cover the judgment, or may look to her school district
employer for indemnification.
In the hypothetical scenario, all but one defendant have likely
successfully avoided trial.' The parent may be able to prevail
against the remaining teacher. Nominal, and perhaps presumed and/or
punitive damages may be awarded, as well as attorneys' fees, which
may be substantial. The parent's actual financial gain, however, may
be zero or less. If nominal damages and attorneys' fees are awarded,
the parents' will not have to pay their lawyer but will not receive any
money. If the teacher's assets186 are used up to pay her attorney, the
prevailing parent will be unable to collect any damages awarded, and
may owe their own attorney besides.
The outcome in the hypothetical case is actually more favorable to
the plaintiff than that in a recent Buckley-based Section 1983 claim.
In Maynard v. Greater Hoyt Sch. Dist.,'87 the plaintiff parents
claimed that the school (through board of education members) had
shared information with the press on four separate occasions about the
costs and details of their son's $100,000-annual-tuition residential
special education placement.'88 The resulting newspaper articles
identified the student by name and ran his photograph. The release
of this information in board meeting minutes was undisputed, and
would appear to be a clear violation of Buckley. It also had significant
consequences for the family. The school had to raise property taxes to
pay for the placement. Taxpayers were upset about the tax increase
183. See, e.g., Krebs, 797 F. Supp. at 1262 (enjoining certain uses of student social security
numbers as violating their Buckley rights).
184. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (upholding award of more than
$240,000 in attorneys' fees in case with about $33,000 in actual damages).
185. Where the alleged violator is a school board member, there may be no viable
defendants. See Maynard, 876 F. Supp. at 1108 (dismissing some defendants as private actors,
and remaining defendant school board and members because violation was not pursuant to official
policy, and because of good faith immunity).
186. And, of course, any insurance assets or school board assets available via indemnifica-
tion.
187. 876 F. Supp. 1104 (D.S.D. 1995).
188. See South Dakota, 20 IDELR 105 (FPCO 1993).
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and asked why it was necessary. After the newspaper articles came
out, the parents were harassed.'89
The parents apparently first filed an FPC Office complaint in early
1992.190 Over one year later, the Office issued a finding that
Buckley had been violated, and offered to close the complaint if the
school assured the Office it would comply with Buckley in the future,
and notified school officials of their Buckley obligations. 9'
The parents then filed Section 1983 claims alleging Buckley
violations by the school district, board of education members in their
official and individual capacities, the reporter who ran the story, and
a citizen who allegedly made derogatory comments about their son
after reading the article. The matter never went to trial because
defendants were all granted summary judgment. Summary judgment
was granted to the reporter and citizen because they did not act under
color of state law. 192 The school board members were found to have
good faith immunity in their individual capacity because they released
the information pursuant to state law requiring public minutes of board
of education meetings.'93 The release of the minutes was found not
to be pursuant to official board policy or custom, which meant that the
school district and board members in their official capacities were not
liable."'
In short, although the Maynard court held that Buckley violations
were actionable under Section 1983, all of the plaintiffs' Section 1983
claims were dismissed on pretrial motions despite the following: (1) all
possible institutional and individual defendants were sued; (2) the
defendants' violations of Buckley were repeated and undisputed; and
(3) the violations caused the plaintiffs actual harm. The Maynard case
compellingly demonstrates that Section 1983 claims are no panacea for
enforcing Buckley.
189. See Maynard, 876 F. Supp. at 1106-07.
190. See South Dakota, 20 IDELR 105. This FPC Office finding does not name the
family. However, the state of origin (South Dakota) is the same as in Maynard, and the facts
described are virtually identical. The court decision refers to an FPC Office complaint and
finding. Maynard, 876 F. Supp. at 1107.
191. See South Dakota, 20 IDELR at 106-07.
192. See Maynard, 876 F. Supp. at 1107.
193. See id. at 1108.
194. See id. The court found that in releasing the board meeting minutes with personally
identifiable information to the public, the board was not acting pursuant to its own custom, but
rather in accordance with state law. The court also found that any isolated sharing of information
by individual board members was not in accordance with official policy or custom and therefore
not actionable. Id. at 1108 n.1. Finally, the court dismissed Section 1985 claims, as conduct
motivated by animus toward handicapped persons did not constitute the required class-based
animus. See id. at 1109.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As described above in Part II, enforcement mechanisms under
Buckley include FPC Office complaints, and the withdrawal of federal
education funds. Private lawsuits under Buckley are unavailable.
Elements of, or specific showings of harm, required for state law tort
and contract claims are generally not present when Buckley is violated;
however, workplace discipline of employees who violate Buckley is a
possibility. Moreover, and as described above in Part III, Section 1983
claims are available in theory, but in actuality have very limited
applicability.
It is easy to complain that this current set of Buckley enforcement
mechanisms is unfair, because it provides no remedy to persons
aggrieved by violation of their Buckley rights. In fact, problems
resulting from the current set of enforcement mechanisms are much
broader in scope. First, Buckley itself provides enforcement mecha-
nisms at two extreme ends on a spectrum of strength: at one end is
the impotent FPC Office complaint process, and at the other, the
possibility of withholding all federal education funds, a prospect so
harsh it is never used. There is no workable enforcement mechanism
in the middle of this spectrum, frustrating the statute's purpose.
Second, the absence of a workable enforcement mechanism is at wide
variance with the expectations Buckley itself creates in parents that
they have Buckley "rights." Third, the lack of a workable enforcement
mechanism, when coupled with the heavy burdens Buckley places on
schools and the many conflicts it presents with other laws, provides
schools with little incentive to comply with its provisions.
Two final problems with current enforcement mechanisms arise
from their inconsistency. To the extent that workable, indirect
enforcement remedies exist, such as Section 1983 or special education
statutory claims, they are inconsistently available: only to selected
aggrieved persons, and under limited circumstances. Further, the
enforcement mechanisms which do exist are not consistent with those
available under other laws regulating student records.
A. Buckley Currently Lacks A Workable Enforcement Mechanism
As described above in Part II.A, Buckley currently provides only
for FPC Office complaints to enforce its provisions. If a school is
determined to have a pattern or practice of Buckley violations, the
Office may initiate proceedings to revoke federal funds, but apparently
has never done so. Congress's two enforcement mechanisms, FPC
Office complaints and withdrawal of federal education funds, are
[Vol. 21:29
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respectively too weak and too harsh to encourage school compliance.
FPC Office complaints are infrequent, and involve no penalties.
Withdrawal of all federal funding is too harsh a penalty for the
government to actually use, and also appears to be out of proportion
to most student records violations. Moreover, the withdrawal of
federal funds is a penalty against the school, rather than the individuals
responsible for Buckley violations.
One court has recognized that these two enforcement mechanisms
leave aggrieved persons and schools between a fake rock and a place so
hard no one goes there.19 This court characterized the FPC Office
complaint procedure as part of the "complete inadequacy of the
Secretary's regulations, coupled with the statute's failure to require
more complete relief for aggrieved individuals, [which have the effect
of] exhausting the complainant without any meaningful possibility of
enforcement by the Secretary."1 96  This court characterized the
withholding of federal funds as a "drastic remedy ... which the
Secretary cannot be expected to threaten and/or act upon. '197
B. Buckley's Current Enforcement Mechanisms are at Odds With
Parents' Statutorily-Created Expectations That They
Have Buckley "Rights"
Technically speaking, Buckley does not grant parents any rights.
In fact, and as several courts have noted,'98 it does not impose any
obligations on schools. Instead, Buckley imposes conditions on schools
in order to receive federal education funds.'99 One of these condi-
tions is that educational agencies attempt to annually inform parents
of their "rights" under Buckley, as discussed in Part I.G.00 The
statute and regulations are explicit: it is not school obligations and
responsibilities about which parents must be informed, but rather
195. See Krebs, 797 F. Supp. at 1257.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
199. Buckley is not the only federal education statute structured in this manner. A more
well-known example is the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1461 (1994), which is also spending legislation. The IDEA conditions receipt of federal
special education funds on states' preparation of a state plan which complies with numerous
substantive IDEA provisions, such as providing eligible students with a free appropriate education
in the least restrictive environment, and notifying parents of their due process and other "rights."
Unlike Buckley, however, the IDEA provides federal funds specifically marked for states which
choose to comply with its provisions.
200. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(e); 34 C.F.R. § 99.7.
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"their [the parent's] rights under" the Act.20 1 Specifically, parents
who read the schools' annual required notice will see a "statement that
the parent or eligible student has a right to: '20 2 inspect and review
their child's records, request correction of records, consent under most
circumstances before records are released to third parties, and file
complaints with the Family Policy Compliance Office. 3
This notice of parent rights is considered important enough to
require schools to "effectively notify parents of students who have a
primary or home language other than English."'2°4 The parent rights
notice is also considered important enough that Congress recently
strengthened the language regarding the method of notification. An
earlier version of Buckley required schools merely to "inform" parents
of their rights. In 1994, Buckley was amended to require that schools"effectively inform" 205 parents of their Buckley rights, because of
concerns that some schools were publishing the notice of rights in
newspapers or by other means whereby parents were not informed.2 6
From the parent/student's perspective, then, Buckley provides
significant rights. Review of current enforcement mechanisms
demonstrates that these rights exist largely on paper. Parent Buckley
"rights" are enforceable only through FPC complaints.0 7 Section
1983 claims are theoretically available, but actually can succeed largely
only against individual public school employees who themselves violate
Buckley, and who may not have the assets to pay a substantial
judgment or attorneys' fees. 2 1
C. Buckley's Current Enforcement Mechanisms Give Schools Little
Incentive To Comply With Its Provisions
From the school's perspective, Buckley imposes numerous and
detailed requirements for handling student records set out in Part I,
above. As that Part's overview of Buckley makes clear, schools and
their employees face significant burdens in order to comply with
Buckley.
201. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(e); 34 C.F.R. § 99.7(a).
202. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(e); 34 C.F.R. § 99.7(a).
203. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(e); 34 C.F.R. § 99.7(a).
204. 34 C.F.R. § 99.7(d).
205. Act of Oct. 20, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3913 (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232 (1994)).
206. See 140 CONG. REC. S10290-10291 (July 28, 1994) (comments of Senator Grassley).
207. See supra Part II.A.1.
208. See supra Part III.B.1.
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For example, 20 9 when schools receive requests from parents to
inspect their children's records, staff time is required to retrieve the
records. Often, a staff member must stay with the parent during her
review of the records in order to maintain their integrity. Further, staff
time may be needed to provide parents with any requested explanations
or interpretations of the records.210  Buckley provides no limits on
the number of times a parent may request review, nor on the duration
of any parent review. 211 Some students' school records are volumi-
nous, and it may take many hours or days for a parent to review
them.212 The forty-five day outer limit on responding to requests for
review of records 213 gives schools some leeway in deciding when it
can spare staff for these purposes. However, Buckley provides no funds
to schools for these labor costs. Moreover, schools cannot charge
parents for these costs; only when copies of records are involved may
parents be charged copying fees, which cannot include the labor costs
to retrieve the records.214 In more limited cases, a parent may be
entitled to a free copy of records. 15
Schools must respond appropriately to a variety of family requests
for records, such as those by noncustodial parents, nonbiological
parents, relatives, or other persons acting as parents, and requests by
students themselves, as well as requests for interpretations and
explanations of records.216 While Buckley does not mandate staff
training, the secretaries and office workers who primarily receive these
requests cannot be expected to understand Buckley's requirements
without such training.217 Schools must also respond appropriately,
and staff must also be trained, in how to respond to requests for
records by persons outside of the student's family, such as subpoenas,
requests from police, from other schools in which the student is
enrolled or will enroll, prospective employers, governmental authorities,
the press and public, and from other school employees.218
209. The foregoing discussion of school burdens under Buckley is adapted from the more
thorough examination in a companion article by the author. See Daggett, supra note 9.
210. See supra Part I.D.
211. See Huntsville, Ala. Sch. Dist., 24 IDELR 82, 83 (FPCO 1996).
212. For example, the author represented school districts in several special education
hearings where the records of the student took up an entire four-drawer file cabinet.
213. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
216. For a discussion of persons with Buckley rights, see supra Part I.C.
217. Compare the IDEA which explicitly requires staff training on legal requirements for
special education records. 34 C.F.R. § 300.572(c) (1996).
218. See supra Part I.E.
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The disclosure decision is not a simple one. Whether the request
is from a member of the student's family, another school employee
such as a teacher (whom the school must decide has a legitimate
educational interest), or an outsider, schools must first determine
whether the records requested are actually Buckley records, and second
whether disclosure is permitted. Whatever the decision, in the case of
requests by outsiders, schools must maintain an access log of uncon-
sented-to requests for records, as well as of most unconsented-to actual
disclosures. Where consent has been provided, the school must
determine that the consent form meets Buckley requirements, and
maintain a copy.
The determination of what is a Buckley record has significant
consequences. Because of state open records and meetings laws,
documents about students may be on the one hand Buckley records,
which can be disclosed only upon parent consent, or on the other,
public agency records which any member of the public can access upon
request. Mistaken disclosure of sole possession notes, for example,
causes them to lose their status as such.219 The Buckley status of
some documents such as test protocols and raw data is not clear.
Responding appropriately to subpoenas of student records can be
particularly difficult. Depending on the subpoena, schools may be
obligated to notify parents before complying, or may be forbidden from
notifying parents.20 Moreover, in some situations such as those
where a student or former student is a witness in a trial, and one
party's attorney subpoenas records, schools may be uncomfortable
providing the subpoenaed records without court review, and may seek
a protective order to avoid complying with a subpoena. Cases like
these make it clear that responding to requests for school records
involves not only substantial staff time and thought, but also legal
advice and costs.
In short, complying with Buckley's conditions on the receipt of
federal education funds is not a small burden for schools, and in fact
involves significant resources which are not specifically federally
funded. Buckley's requirements also burden schools as they carry out
routine activities. For example, an honor roll cannot be released to the
local paper unless the school has designated the information as
directory, given parents an opportunity to object, and removed the
name of students with objecting parents.22' Perhaps the biggest
219. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
221. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.34.
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burden Buckley places on schools, however, is dealing with its
inconsistencies, both internally and its conflicts with other laws.
Consider, for example, the situation where a school employee suspects
a student has been abused and information about the possible abuse is
contained in student records. State statute requires certified school
employees to report suspected abuse to law enforcement or social
services authorities.222 Criminal penalties may result if abuse goes
unreported.223 Buckley, on the other hand, does not provide explicit-
ly for reporting suspected child abuse without parent consent. Extreme
cases may permit disclosure under the emergency provision, but that
exception is to be narrowly construed and has been judicially interpret-
ed to not include nonurgent medical conditions.224 Proving the
information about abuse under the subpoena provision for disclosure
actually acts as a Catch-22; to issue a subpoena, a court needs
information contained in records. Prior to 1994, school employees who
suspected abuse could report their concerns consistent with Buckley
pursuant to pre-1974 child abuse reporting statutes. That exception
was, however, essentially eliminated in 1994 when it was limited to
reporting to juvenile justice authorities. 22' The author recommends
that school employees resolve the conflict in the child's best interests
by reporting suspected child abuse. As the foregoing discussion
demonstrates, however, this leaves the school employee open to a
claimed Buckley violation. In a worst case scenario where a teacher or
other school employee reports suspected abuse by a parent in a
nonemergency situation, a Section 1983 claim by the parent is possible.
Somewhat similarly, school employees who suspect a student has
engaged in criminal behavior at school may want to, or may be
required to226 report their suspicions to the police. Where the police
have formed a suspicion of criminal activity by a student based on
nonschool information, the police can use Buckley's subpoena
provisions to obtain school records. On the other hand, when a school
employee suspects a student, and the police have no other basis for the
suspicion, Buckley is an obstacle to reporting. Again, if the basis for
the suspicion involves student records, and there is no emergency,
222. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.44.010 et seq. (1996).
223. See id.
224. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44014 (1993) (if school employee is attacked, assaulted
or menaced by student, police report must be made); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-233f-233g (1988)
(assaults on teachers must be reported to police); TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.303 (1990).
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Buckley provides no explicit exception permitting such reporting
without parent consent.
Also troubling is the situation faced by certain school employees
and agents who provide counseling and other assistance about student
substance abuse problems. If the student with the problem is old
enough under state law to get substance abuse help without parental
consent, federal health laws require that the records of that treatment
remain confidential, even as to parents, unless the student consents in
writing to their disclosure. 27 On the other hand, Buckley requires
schools to provide parent access to records. Suppose, for example, that
an older student confides a drug or alcohol problem to a school-based
drug counselor, and the parent calls the counselor and asks for
information about the student. To the extent information is contained
in Buckley records, that statute entitles parents to access to the records
and to explanations and interpretations of them. Federal health laws
regarding substance abuse records, on the other hand, prohibit
disclosure of such information to parents (and in fact, to other school
employees) unless the student agrees.
These burdens, in conjunction with the lack of a meaningful
enforcement mechanism, give schools little incentive to comply with
Buckley. The incentive to comply is especially lacking when Buckley
conflicts with another law, such as a child abuse reporting mandate,
which does have a powerful enforcement mechanism.
D. To the Extent Workable Buckley Enforcement Mechanisms Exist,
They are Inconsistently Available
Whether there are meaningful enforcement mechanisms (primarily
Section 1983 claims) varies tremendously. First and most clearly, there
is little incentive from enforcement procedures for private schools and
private employees to comply with Buckley. At most, the private
school may have to respond to an FPC Office complaint and, in order
to resolve that complaint, may be asked to agree to some things (such
as avoiding future violations). Loss of federal education funding is a
theoretical possibility, but it has never actually happened. However,
the private school faces no administrative hearing, and Section 1983
claims will fail as there is no action under color of state law.228
Moreover, and as the foregoing examination of enforcement options
has demonstrated, Buckley is not a law which "carries a big stick" for
public school districts, their administrators, supervisors and board
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 290 dd (1994); 42 C.F.R. § 2.14 (1996).
228. See supra Part III.B.1.
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members. A public school district (or administrators or board
members in a district) which violates Buckley may also have to respond
to an FPC Office complaint and, in order to resolve that complaint,
may be asked to agree to some things (such as avoiding future
violations). Again, loss of federal education funding is a theoretical
possibility, but it has never actually happened. Finally, like the private
school, the public school district faces no administrative hearing. Any
Section 1983 claim is likely to be dismissed, on Monell policy or
custom, and/or lack of respondeat superior liability grounds.229
On the other hand, and as previously discussed, the public
employee committing the Buckley violation faces some of the biggest
sticks of all-the possibility of a civil rights judgment involving
damages and attorneys' fees, as well as job discipline up to and
including discharge.
E. Buckley's Lack of Workable Enforcement Mechanisms is
Inconsistent With Other Laws Regulating Student Records
This situation is in marked contrast to other laws regulating
student records in more limited ways. For example, violations
involving special education student records can be redressed under the
federal special education statute through special education hearings and
appeals to a court, in which the opposing party is a school district with
substantial assets.230 The IDEA requires states to set up an adminis-
trative hearing system with impartial hearing officers to hear special
education disputes, including claims that the IDEA's records provi-
sions have been violated.231 The IDEA was recently amended to
require states to offer mediation as an initial step before proceeding to
the impartial adversarial hearing.232 If the matter does go to a
hearing, the hearing officer's decision may be appealed to a court, and
attorneys' fees reimbursement is available to prevailing plaintiffs.233
The IDEA also contains a little-known provision requiring state
education agencies to set up a complaint procedure.234 Under this
complaint procedure, any "organization or individual may file a signed
written complaint" asserting that a public agency has violated the
229. See id.
230. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1994).
231. See id.
232. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-17, § 101 (615)(e) 111 Stat. 37, 89 (1997) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)).
233. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)(2) (1994) (appeals); 1415(e)(4) (attorneys' fees).
234. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.660-662 (1996).
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IDEA in some way.23 Within sixty days of the complaint, the state
educational agency must carry out any necessary investigation, review
all information, make a determination about whether the IDEA has in
fact been violated, and issue a written decision with findings of fact
and reasoning.2" The state educational agency may also provide
technical assistance or require corrective actions "to achieve compli-
ance.'237 Parents "and other interested individuals" must be notified
of their rights to file such complaints. 38
Under Section 504, disability discrimination complaints, including
claims that parents have been denied access to records, may be filed
with the Office of Civil Rights (OCR).239 OCR's complaint investi-
gation and resolution process is similar to that for Buckley. The
important difference is that a private cause of action is also available
under Section 504.240 State student records laws may also provide a
private cause of action.241 Violations of the federal laws involving
substance abuse records can result in criminal prosecution. 42
Violations of state public records and meetings laws may, depending
on the state, be redressed through an administrative hearing with
possible appeal to court 43 or through civil claims possibly involving
attorneys' fees reimbursement for prevailing plaintiffs. 244
Simply put, it makes no sense to provide stiff enforcement
measures for laws which regulate student records in a limited way on
the one hand, and on the other hand to enact a statute which compre-
hensively and with no small burden to schools regulates student
records, but provides no significant means of enforcement. This lack
of a hearing opportunity or other meaningful enforcement mechanism
is especially puzzling because Buckley itself requires schools to conduct
hearings where the accuracy of records are challenged.245
235. 34 C.F.R. § 300.662.
236. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.661(a). An extension to the sixty day time line may occur under
"exceptional circumstances." Id. at 300.661(b).
237. Id. § 300.661(c).
238. Id. § 300.661(b).
239. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 107.6; 107.7 (1996).
240. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1994).
241. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 228-093 et seq. (1996) (providing persons injured by
student records violation may sue for injunctive relief and attorneys' fees).
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 290 (1994).
243. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-18; 1-19 (1988).
244. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.400(4), (5) (1996) (providing private cause of
action for alleged violations of the Washington public records law, with possible recovery of
attorneys' fees, and treble damages).
245. See supra Part I.F.
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F Congress Should Adopt a Workable Enforcement Mechanism For
Buckley in the Form of an Impartial Administrative Hearing
In between the two extremes of FPC Office complaints and
removing all federal funds, Congress needs to provide a middle-ground
enforcement mechanism which is not overly harsh but does give
schools an incentive to comply with Buckley and which provides
parents with a meaningful remedy. As described immediately above
in Part IV.E, other statutes regulating access to school records not only
provide models of possible Buckley enforcement mechanisms, but also
provide a marked contrast to Buckley's paucity of enforcement options.
The author urges Congress to provide a meaningful enforcement
remedy for Buckley. A private cause of action is neither necessary nor
suggested. Instead, however, Congress is encouraged to consider
making available an administrative hearing such as that which is in
place for special education disputes. 246
Complaints under Buckley may fall into one of five categories.
First, parents may claim they have improperly been denied access to
their child's school records. Second, parents may claim that their
child's school records were improperly disclosed without their consent.
Third, parents may claim that their child's records contain information
which is inaccurate, misleading, or unduly invades the child's privacy.
Fourth, parents may claim that the school's notice of their rights is
defective. Fifth and finally, parents may claim that the school has a
policy or practice of violating Buckley.
Complaints asserting a policy or practice of Buckley violations by
a public school are likely actionable under Section 1983, as discussed
in Section VI, supra. The other four kinds of complaints are unlikely
to be actionable as civil rights violations. An enforcement procedure
is needed for these kinds of claims. The enforcement mechanism
chosen should not be unnecessarily adversarial, as the school and
parent parties need to work together for many years in order to further
the child's educational interests. Moreover, the chosen enforcement
mechanism should work rather quickly, particularly in the case of
denied access to records. Finally, while an enforcement mechanism
which provides for damages may encourage school compliance, money
damages seem unlikely to compensate injuries caused by Buckley
violations, just as is the case for violations of the special education
statute. For example, if a student's transcript is sent to a prospective
246. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1994).
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employer, or her grades are mentioned to other students without
consent, the harm seems unmeasurable in dollars, nor can damages
truly compensate such a loss.
An administrative hearing, perhaps preceded by voluntary
mediation, or a more formal and time-circumscribed complaint
resolution process seem to offer the most hope for putting teeth in
Buckley without unduly burdening schools. Either an administrative
hearing or a formal complaint procedure with processing deadlines, as
opposed to actual litigation, would provide the quicker resolution
necessary for Buckley claims. Additionally, both hearings and
complaint procedures are less adversarial than litigation, and may not
require attorney involvement, which avoids burdening schools (and
parents) with litigation expenses. The hearing option provides the
parent with an opportunity to be heard by an impartial person.
Currently, the only hearing provided by Buckley is to challenge
records, 47 and that hearing need not be by an impartial person, nor
by a person not employed by the school. 48
Money damages and attorneys' fees would not be available under
either process. However, hearing officers or the entity conducting the
complaint resolution procedure should have authority to order schools
to comply with Buckley, such as by ordering the removal of inaccurate
records, ordering schools to provide access to parents, ordering schools
to attempt to retrieve records improperly disclosed, and ordering
schools to modify invalid provisions in the annual parent notification
and train staff who violate Buckley. The hearing system and/or formal
complaint resolution process could be federally administered through
the FPC Office, or state educational agencies could be required to set
up such a system as a condition of their receipt of federal education
funds.
CONCLUSION
Buckley was enacted and amended for laudable goals: to protect
the accuracy and confidentiality of student records, and to enhance
parent involvement in education. However, Congress' failure to
provide a meaningful enforcement mechanism for Buckley, coupled
with its burdens and internal and external conflicts, give schools little
incentive to comply. Section 1983 claims may provide an incentive for
public schools to avoid official patterns, practices and policies of
Buckley violations, but are unlikely to provide relief for other claims,
247. See supra Part I.F.
248. See id.
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particularly of individual instances of Buckley violations. Congress is
urged to "buck up" Buckley by adding a meaningful administrative
enforcement mechanism.
